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Abstract.
The ongoing Burundi crisis offers a unique opportunity to scrutinize the changing political economy
of preventive framing of violence, and particularly genocide as a representational resource in
prevention. The paper shows that labels and labeling practices are not disconnected from the local
dynamics of conflict, and might have counterintuitive effects in this respect. The portrayal of
Burundi’s crisis— the frequent intimations that the recent crisis can lead to genocide, the invocations
of the ethnic frame, and the repeated comparisons with Rwanda and Burundi’s own past— has
proceeded through a problematic analysis-by-analogy and has served to obscure the core drivers of
the recent violence and the dynamics of escalation on the ground. Further to this, the portrayal has
not only proven ineffective in translating increased attention into action, it also has had three
unintended and potentially perverse effects on the conflict itself, together fueling the political
standoff rather than helping to resolve the crisis.
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Introduction
The unforgotten1 and oft reminisced2 reluctance to name the 1994 violence in Rwanda as genocide 
has left a mark on public conscience, and Burundi’s recent crisis represents the inversion of sorts 
of this political economy of labeling violence. If in 1994 the label was a scarce resource, in 2015 it 
became a currency widely spent, and arguably, devalued as a result. And whilst in 1994 the politics 
revolved around labels triggering international obligations, today we deal with a whole gamut of 
actors drawing on the label, some to trigger obligation in anticipation, as a preventative mechanism 
(e.g., IOs and AU), some in search of close-enough comparators and familiar frames (e.g., media), 
others to score political credit through the delegitimation of opponents (domestic actors, whether 
opposition or the incumbents). Altogether, these dynamics offer rich insights into the changing 
political economy of deployment of the ‘ultimate crime’ label. The deep politicization also forces 
us to reflect on the status and continued usefulness of genocide as a dominant frame to activate in 
times of crisis, and today as a distinctly anticipatory device to raise alarm rather than a post-facto 
designation (such as with UN ICOIs). 
The article analyses the vagaries of prevention3 and “preventative framing”4 of violence, 
focusing both on how different actors portrayed points of “critical escalation” and the nature of 
violence (mass atrocity) predicted in Burundi between 2015-2017.5 The #StopThisMovie prevention 
campaign referenced in the title, aiming to prevent the crisis escalating to a genocide, reflects 
the broader trend whereby observers have been consumed with anticipation and the framing of 
“Burundi’s great fear.”6 The veritable genocide reticence-turned-logorrhea witnessed in this crisis 
is directly tied to the perceived close resemblance of Burundi and Rwanda and hence the pressure 
not to repeat the mistakes of the past, if not to make up for them. But, there is also the oft cited 
“given the country’s history” clause.7 The pervasive analysis-by-analogy, however, is problematic. 
It will be argued that the portrayal— the intimations that the recent crisis can lead to genocide, the 
invocations of the ethnic frame, and the repeated comparisons with Rwanda and Burundi’s own 
past— serves to obscure the core drivers of the recent violence and the dynamics of escalation on 
the ground. 
The paper then proceeds to investigate whether such representation might nonetheless be used 
as currency to garner greater visibility and international involvement. In other words, can costs in 
terms of accuracy be redeemed by greater attention? The argument that emerges here is that conflict 
prevention has come at the cost of conflict resolution. Not only has attention failed to translate into 
1 Hayes Brown, “The Inside Story Of How The U.S. Acted To Prevent Another Rwanda,” Think Progress, December 20, 
2013, accessed March 15, 2017, https://thinkprogress.org/the-inside-story-of-how-the-u-s-acted-to-prevent-another-
rwanda-e91beac73aca.
2 The failure to intervene and the silent by-stander status of the international community in 1994 is the cornerstone of 
political narratives in Rwanda and is often highlighted during commemorative periods by the President and the 
political class more broadly. The guilt, argues Filip Reyntjens, has been turned into ‘genocide credit.’ See, Filip 
Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship,” African Affairs 103, no. 411 (2004), 200. Beyond 
Rwanda, the lack of international effort to prevent and later stop the genocide has left a deep imprint on international 
conscience and has made genocide a cornerstone of the R2P norm and accompanying architecture developed since 
1994.
3 Early warning specifically, rather than risk assessment.
4 See, David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006), 229. Scheffer argues 
that analysts should use the ‘G’ word freely to “publicly describe precursors of genocide and react rapidly.”
5 The year 2015 marks the beginning of the crisis and 2017 is when this article was finalized but also when much of the 
international attention has petered out.
6 Fred Bridgland, “Burundi’s ‘Great Fear,’” The Sunday Herald, January 3, 2016, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.
heraldscotland.com/news/14178785.Burundi_s__great_fear_/?ref=rss.
7 “Burundi Crisis: from Disputed Polls to ‘Genocide’ Fears,” JusticeInfo.net, October 12, 2016, accessed, March 15, 2017, 
http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/resources/burundi-crisis-from-disputed-polls-to-genocide-fears.html.
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effective action in Burundi, the labeling practice might have produced some unintended, even 
perverse effects. The greater international and regional resolve to act has in fact met with radical 
rebuttals from the government, including the withdrawal from the ICC and pronouncement that 
any international force would be seen as an invading force and engaged militarily. 
But we cannot simply argue that the increased attention has been ineffective. Instead, we must 
seriously consider the possibility of unintended effects. The article explores three propositions 
in this regard: First, genocide-label-driven interventionism in Burundi has increased regime 
isolationism and emboldened the regime to resort to sovereignty as an effective last resort measure 
to shore up impunity. It has effectively lowered the government’s willingness to bow down, 
cooperate and negotiate with its critics, arguably the opposite of the intended effect. Second, in 
terms of violence, we must consider whether the genocide frame and campaigning has not merely 
contributed to decreased visibility of violence and repression, which has now moved offstage. 
Perhaps more seriously, we need to consider whether the campaigning has taken away energy 
from civil war focus as a more pressing threat. Third, in terms of the genocide label, we must 
consider that protracted alarm sounding devalues not only the G-word as currency, but strategic 
labeling as a preventative device in general. Over two years of troughs and peaks of deployment 
of the most powerful label, Burundi is no closer to an inclusive political dialogue. In the case of 
Burundi at least, the mislabeling of the crisis has fueled the political standoff rather than helping 
to resolve it.
The analysis serves as an opening to broader reflections on labeling of conflict in Africa. The paper 
foregrounds the contested nature of labeling on the ground whereby labeling and representation 
act as resources feeding political and conflict dynamics themselves, rather than being analytical 
devices separate from the ongoing crisis. The recent (mis)characterization of conflict in Burundi in 
fact enters a long-standing historical process of local contestation over conflict labels— including 
over the term of genocide— that feed the cycles of metaconflict and conflict on the ground.8 The 
paper concludes with reflections on whether/how the labels of “genocide” and “ethnic conflict” 
are still useful to our understanding of conflict in a region where they have been typically intensely 
deployed. The paper also cautions against the unbridled use of the label of genocide for prevention 
and makes a call for a more self-reflective and politically conscious preventive framing.
Labeling Conflict: The Uses, Manipulations and Impacts of Crisis Portrayal 
The present paper unpicks the tensions between two frameworks that see labeling as a 
representational resource. The first focuses on labeling as a potentially positive resource garnering 
preventive action. As such, this conception of labeling is embedded within the problem-solving 
framework of conflict management. The second offers a more politicized reading of labeling 
as a “symbolic technology”9 opening the space for contested forms of potentially self-defeating 
interventionism. As such, it presents a more critical frame of conflict transformation. The difference 
is important. While the former framework implicitly treats labeling as separate from the unfolding 
conflict, the latter sees it as part and parcel of the conflict (struggle over dominance) and metaconflict 
(conflict over the meaning of the confrontation). Adopting but expanding the latter framework, the 
current paper looks not merely at the intended effects of intervention, but rather the unstated and 
unintended effects of increased attention unmatched by effective preventative action.
It is now a well-established dictum that the way we talk about violence affects the way we 
respond to it, affectively and collectively. “Recognised severity of political problems – including 
government-organized or sanctioned mass killings is a function of the socio-linguistic processing 
8 For a discussion of a 1995 COI on Burundi and the impacts of its designation of ‘acts of genocide’ on the broader 
metaconflict, see Andrea Purdeková, “Fact-Finding as a Conflict Resource? The Political Anatomy of International 
Investigative Missions on Burundi (1993, 1995, 2015),” Unpublished Manuscript, 2017.
9 Roland Marchal, “Warlordism and Terrorism: How to Obscure an Already Confusing Crisis? The Case of Somalia,” 
International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007), 1091-1106.
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and naming of them.”10 The “power to define”11 revolves around labels’ potential to catalyze 
outrage and mobilize action, but also their propensity to structure “hierarchies of concern.”12 In this 
respect, the label of genocide trumps other characterizations, in general, and especially in Africa 
and the Great Lakes Region. While “there is no hierarchy of crimes in international law… popular 
understanding of genocide as the “ultimate crime” generate obvious incentives for victims and 
their advocates to invoke the “G word” to rally support for intervention, even when the objective 
criteria for genocide are not met.”13 The existence of a purpose-made genocide convention also 
“reinforces the public acknowledgment of genocide’s special status, not only as a matter of criminal 
law, but as a moral outrage to humanity.”14 After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the label has indeed 
been widely invoked by political actors and civil society alike across a broad range of conflict and 
countries in Africa, ranging from Sudan/Darfur to Kenya, Zimbabwe, and beyond.
But the recent, and much more intense and sustained, deployment of the label in Burundi 
cannot be seen outside of the country’s physical and perceived social proximity to Rwanda. It is the 
status of Burundi as the “false twin”15 of its neighbor that gives the G word particular traction in 
this case.16 The recent case of Burundi then wedges open the pressing query of what impacts ensue 
when the G word is applied intensely and aggressively, rather than cautiously or half-heartedly as 
in the past, and in anticipation rather than after the fact. 
In its study of impacts, the current paper opens up beyond the two dominant analytical 
tendencies, in line with its more critical take on labels’ role in an unfolding conflict. First, the 
paper does not paint a simple story of “reductionist media,” a mislabeling borne of benevolent 
outsiders looking from the outside in. Instead, the paper foregrounds the constellation of different 
actors that co-produce the narrative on Burundi, foreign and local, and the ways in which the 
G label permeates political dynamics on the ground. The participants in the commentary on the 
Burundi crisis include academics attempting to be relevant by blogging and contributing quotes 
for news coverage, news correspondents attempting more in-depth political analysis, and experts 
and government officials “cybertimately” exchanging fire on twitter. To understand the political 
economy of the genocide label and its impacts, we first must acknowledge and understand this 
complex configuration of actors and interests. 
Second, understanding impacts means moving beyond the study of intended effects to 
unintended, even potentially counter-intuitive ones. The difficulty of translating increased attention 
and resolve triggered by the G label into effective action has been highlighted before,17 and seems 
painfully to be the case in Burundi again, where international attempts at intervention and criminal 
investigation have not borne their desired results. But a frame focused on effectiveness is limiting. 
It obscures other effects borne of action and inaction. 
10 William F.S. Miles, “Labeling ‘Genocide’ in Sudan: A Constructionist Analysis of Darfur,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 
1, no. 3 (2006), 251-263.
11 Ibid., 254.
12 Ibid.
13 Kate Cronin-Furman and Michael Broache, “Should We be Using the G-word in Burundi?,” Washington Post, December 
15, 2015, accessed March 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/15/should-we-
be-using-the-g-word-in-burundi/?utm_term=.d684c4a4cd67.
14 Miles, Labeling Genocide in Sudan, 261.
15 René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
16 “The events in Burundi [after all] are unfolding in the long shadow of Rwanda [its neighbor]. Observers – whether 
political figures, UN representatives, journalists, or non-governmental organizations – have the vocabulary of modern 
genocide prevention at their disposal because of the lessons their respective organizations endeavored to absorb 
over the past two decades following the genocide in Rwanda.” In Conor Gaffey, “Burundi Must Learn the Lessons 
of Rwanda to Avoid Genocide,” Newsweek, December 11, 2015, accessed March 20, 2017, http://europe.newsweek.
com/burundi-must-learn-lessons-rwanda-avoid-genocide-336428. It is not only vocabulary, however, that Rwanda 
bequeathed onto the international community, but a new moral impulse to act, translated into the R2P doctrine and a 
new policy and institutional architecture such as the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in the US or the United Nations 
Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide.
17 The examples are Darfur in Sudan or the Central African Republic (CAR). In the latter case, ‘while [the APB] has 
certainly helped formulate policy, it hasn’t been a silver bullet to end the crisis in the CAR,’ see, Haynes, the Inside 
Story. 
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There is now a budding literature exploring the unintended effects of conflict portrayal in 
the African context. Perhaps most prominently, Séverine Autesserre18 has traced the effects of 
“dangerous tales” – dominant conflict narratives— on the actual dynamics of violence in the 
DRC. She shows how the portrayal of causes, impacts and solutions of the crisis has been reduced 
to three powerful but reductive frames focused on natural resources, sexual violence and state-
building, respectively. The “danger” inherent in the tales is not simply them obscuring the key 
causes of violence and its complexity, the variety of impacts beyond rape, and the problems of the 
unquestioned embrace of central state-building. The danger also lies with the perverse effects – the 
tales’ tendency to increase the very violence they were meant merely to depict. Autesserre shows 
how the intense focus on rape has elevated sexual violence’ saliency among armed actors, some of 
whom have deployed it to gain attention and a seat at the negotiating table.19
Last but not least, a broader conception of actors and impacts needs to be matched by a closer 
reading of the historical record. The little-observed fact in the ongoing coverage of the crisis is that 
this is not the first time that controversy arises over the labeling of violence in Burundi and the 
label of genocide in particular. Neither is this the only chapter in Burundi’s story of an interaction 
between conflict portrayal and the actual conflict on the ground.20 We need to understand that 
Burundi has made a transition from decades of imposed silence on state-perpetrated violence and 
the manipulations of portrayal of the conflict by successive governments, and largely international 
oblivion, to selective application of the genocide label through the 1995 Commission of Inquiry 
(COI) on Burundi,21 to an intense discourse surrounding the label and the international spotlight 
of today. We also see a move from post-facto designation or management of conflict labels to the 
anticipatory framing of today. This longer history and politics surrounding the G word are not 
merely ‘context’ but again help shape the label’s deployment and impact today.
 
Portraying the Crisis in Burundi: Analogy, Intimation, and Imminence
The present section outlines the anatomy of portrayal of the crisis in Burundi, from its inception in 
early 2015 to early 2017, exactly two years later, paying particular attention to the ways in which 
violence and its escalation is described and/or intimated to a wider audience, often in order to 
influence it, create impact and garner action. The paper analyzes available commentary on the crisis 
produced by a variety of actors and a range of published sources, including news outlets, UN and 
other international and regional organizations’ releases, academic blogs and news interventions, 
social media commentary, speeches by foreign and domestic dignitaries and organizations, and 
beyond. Study of primary and secondary sources is matched by original fieldwork carried out in 
Burundi in both 2013 and at the inception of the current crisis in 2015.
The study grew out of an observed systematic pattern in the style of reporting on the crisis. 
Importantly, I did not choose ‘genocide’ as a search filter as this could introduce two forms of bias. 
18 Séverine Autessere, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences,” 
African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012), 202-222.
19 A number of other authors have explored the strategic nature of labelling and its potential to obscure the drivers 
of conflict and hence to potentially undermine prospects of resolution. Scorgie-Porter in her study of the Allied 
Democratic Forces (a Uganda-born but DRC-based rebel group) demonstrates how the globally potent label of 
terrorism and Islamic extremism came to take dominance in describing this militant group, thus obscuring important 
aspects of the group’s constitution and the drivers underpinning mobilization into the group and its persistence. 
Scorgie-Porter shows that the Ugandan government has been actively framing the group in line with the global 
discourse on terrorism “in order to draw resources, military, diplomatic and otherwise that stem from participation 
in the war on terror.” See, Lindsay Scorgie-Porter, “Militant Islamists or Borderland Dissidents? An Exploration into 
the Allied Democratic Forces’ Recruitment and Constitution,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 1 (2015), 
1-25. Similarly, in their study of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) framing, Titeca and Costeur try to understand and 
explain the divergent portrayals of the same armed actor by different governments (Ugandan, Congolese and US) 
through the lens of their strategic objectives. See, Kristof Titeca and Theophile Costeur, “An LRA for Everyone: How 
Different Actors Frame the Lord’s Resistance Army,” African Affairs 114, no. 454 (2015), 92-114.
20 See, Purdeková, Fact-Finding.
21 The 1995 International Commission of Inquiry on Burundi concluded the 1993 killings of Tutsi civilians amount to ‘acts 
of genocide.’ No comparable commission has been launched to investigate and qualify the genocide of 1972. See, 
United Nations, Letter Dated 25 July 1996 from secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, August 
22, 1996 (UN Doc. S/1996/682), 74, accessed March 30, 2017, https://undocs.org/S/1996/682.
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First, it would run the risk of skewing findings by excluding alternative portrayals, or conversely 
other dominant labels.22 Second, it would obscure a dynamic whereby the notion of ‘genocide’ 
is very effectively implied without being directly mentioned. The latter aspect is much more 
than a methodological consideration and in fact turns out to be a key finding of the paper. The 
research presented here shows the power of insinuation, and how ambiguity can still communicate 
specificity. “Every instance of language and action,” writes Edelman, “resonates with the memory, 
the fear or the anticipation of other signifiers, so that there are radiating networks of meaning.”23 
The paper will show that intimation and anticipation can be powerful techniques of building affect 
and, indeed, forms of very specific labeling. This is what can be called “silent labeling” or “implicit 
labeling.” 
A close reading of a wide array of text reveals systematic comparison of Burundi to Rwanda 
and a repeated insinuation that the current crisis is an ethnic conflict that can result in genocide. 
This is the case even in articles that clearly mention that political cleavage is key. Three discursive 
strategies arise and will be demonstrated below: i) analysis by analogy (proof by indirect parallel); 
ii) intimation without mention (implicit labeling); and iii) insinuation of imminence of escalation 
(momentum building). In terms of the analysis-by-analogy, this is two-fold: parallels are rendered 
with events in neighboring Rwanda, and with events in Burundi’s own past. These rhetorical 
strategies are pervasive. But analysis-by-analogy is not only logically problematic. It generalizes 
and lumps countries into the same basket (Burundi is largely like Rwanda and hence faces the 
same fate of genocide) and builds a distinctly primordial and unchanging notion of African 
societies centered around ethnicity as the main cleavage (i.e., Burundi’s conflict in the past and 
hence today is about ethnicity). The ethnic frame is so powerful that it is inconceivable that, should 
mass violence occur, it could fall across other-than-ethnic (i.e., political) lines. Genocide in press is 
squarely “ethnic genocide.” Interestingly, even in reporting that highlights the changing nature of 
conflict centered today around political loyalties, the analysis inevitably leads to claiming there are 
risks of ethnic polarization and/or that the ethnic aspect remains important.
Already very early on in the crisis, on April 28, 2015, just after President Pierre Nkurunziza 
announced his intention to run for a controversial third term and vast protests were met with (and 
in fact preceded by) sustained intimidation by the Imbonerakure youth wing of the ruling party, the 
New York Times reproduced the dominant discourse rather faithfully: “
As Burundi edges towards a precipice, parallels with 1994 Rwanda are not unfounded. Like 
in Rwanda’s genocide, the Imbonerakure— or at least the more radical elements— appear 
ready to target civilians en masse. Although Burundi’s crisis is primarily one of politics, with 
antagonisms crossing ethnic boundaries, there is also an ethnic dimension.
Drawing on analogies is met with ambiguity of the target group, portrayal of imminence, and 
the underlining of an “ethnic dimension,” opening the possibility of “ethnic genocide.”24 
A year later, on April 10, 2016, another major news outlet reproduced a strikingly similar 
discourse, this time though putting the dominant discursive frame on ever clearer display: “Burundi 
neighbors Rwanda and has a similar ethnic make-up to the country whose genocide in 1994 still 
casts long shadows of shame and fear. Like Rwanda, Burundi has also seen bitter, genocidal wars 
between Hutu and Tutsi.”25 Both strands of analysis-by-analogy are present here (invocation of 
neighboring Rwanda and Burundi’s own past), as well as intimation without mention (the current 
crisis is never explicitly labeled as genocide but this is very effectively implied), the dominance of 
the ethnic frame in understanding Burundi’s conflict and ethnic essentialism.
This last excerpt faithfully reflects the narrative techniques witnessed elsewhere whereby 
numerous articles on the crisis would incorporate (usually end with) precisely this clause, 
22 As a strategic resource, ‘genocide’ enters a list of other high profile and strategic labels such as ‘terrorism’ or 
‘insurgency’ used by the government to delegitimize the opposition forces and garner attention and resources. Even if 
notable and offering opening to interesting analyses, these labels are limited to the domestic political level, and have 
not seen the exposure and intensity of deployment that ‘genocide’ did.
23Miles, Labeling Genocide in Sudan, 254.
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highlighting parallels with Rwanda and the ethnic make-up of the country.  To give a sense 
of the systematic nature of the portrayal, I include additional excerpts from a range of news 
outlets, with the proviso that this is far from exhaustive. On February 3, 2016, Reuters reported 
that “Nkurunziza’s re-election for a third term last year sparked the country’s crisis and raised 
concerns that there could be a bloody ethnic conflict in a region where memories of Rwanda’s 1994 
genocide are still fresh.”26 The clause combines analogy, intimation, and ethnic framing. Another 
article from the Star on November 11, 2015, suggests “the moral failure to boldly challenge [the 
Rwandan] genocide haunts us still. This time we should name it for what it is, and confront it.”27 
Here we again see both analysis-by-analogy and intimation. Telegraph’s piece from November 10, 
2015, entitled “We are powerless to stop Rwandan-style genocide in Burundi, admits UN” again 
draws on analogy and intimation: “Burundi ended a 12-year civil war in 2005, when Hutu rebels 
fought the army led by Tutsis, the same ethnic divide that led to Rwanda’s 1994 genocide in which 
800,000 people were massacred.” This excerpt is interesting because it proceeds through a two-step 
analogy. It suggests that past conflict in Burundi is defined by ethnicity (implicitly assuming it still 
is, suggesting analogy with the past), and that this very same ethnic cleavage has led to genocide 
in a neighboring country (intimating fear of genocide).
But as mentioned at the outset, this is not simply a story of reductionist media as this sort 
of portrayal is reproduced by other actors and for a number of motives, demonstrating the 
different facets of the broader political economy of crisis labeling. Nonetheless, media often pick 
up and quote from these other sources and actors. One of the prominent voices has been the UN, 
acting through its office of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of 
Genocide, Adama Dieng. The office is geared towards mobilizing early action and the rhetoric 
reflects this. On November 9, 2015, Dieng urged the Security Council to intervene in Burundi “to 
prevent a replay of past horrors,”28 warning inaction risks Burundi “slid[ing] back into an all too 
familiar chaos… No one should underestimate what is at stake, he said, recalling that the country’s 
own history and that of its neighbor, Rwanda, has shown the tragic consequences of failing to act 
when leaders incite violence.”29 The 2016 UN report of the Independent Investigation on Burundi 
suggests “given the country’s history, the danger of the crime of genocide also looms large.”30 
Analogies and intimation re-appear. 
The genocide label has been applied quite explicitly by national and international NGOs. The 
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) and the Burundian Ligue ITEKA have perhaps 
been the most vocal, co-authoring a 200 page report at the end of 2016 entitled “Repression and 
Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi.”31 The report concludes that “all criteria and conditions for 
the perpetration of genocide are in place: ideology, intent, security institutions, mobilization via 
militias, identifying populations to be eliminated and using historical justifications.” The report 
concludes that there is evidence of intent to destroy, in whole or in part an ethnic group, that of 
the Tutsi.32 The lengthy and detailed reasoning might seem to contrast starkly with the snippets of 
26 Michelle, Nichols, “U.N. Expert Find Bid to Smuggle Congo Arms via Rwanda to Burundi Rebels,” Reuters, February 4, 
2016, accessed April 5, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-rwanda-congodemocratic-idUKKCN0VD2HM. 
27 “Burundi Crisis Resembles Run-up to Rwanda Genocide: Editorial,” The Star, November 11, 2015, accessed March 15, 
2017, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2015/11/11/burundi-crisis-resembles-run-up-to-rwanda-genocide-
editorial.html.
28 “Burundi Experiencing ‘Deep Political Crisis’ with Hundreds Dead Since April, Security Council told,” United Nations 
News Centre, November 9, 2015, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52503#.
WQT8yKWRpuY3.
29 Ibid.
30 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) 
established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1, September 20, 2016 (UN Doc. A/HRC/33/37), 19, 
accessed March 12, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/report-united-nations-independent-investigation-
burundi-uniib-established-pursuant.
31 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) & Ligue ITEKA, “Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi,” 
Report No. 685a, November 2016, accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi_report_english-2.
pdf. 
32 Ibid.
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text incorporated into news reports, but close scrutiny suggests that the analytical process is in fact 
similar and revolves around the notion of “mirroring.” 
“Voices from within the AU and elsewhere are warning that Burundi today mirrors the pre-
April 1994 situation in Rwanda,”33 suggests the Scotland Herald. The FIDH-ITEKA report proceeds 
through a similar analysis-by-analogy but in a far greater detail. The projection through mirroring 
carries with it its own logical problems as one might read into divergent phenomena a convergent 
purpose such as when distribution of machetes, distribution of mobile phones to chefs de colline or 
construction of latrines in the countryside are cited as evidence of a genocidal plan.34 The mirroring 
logic has it that such implements were used in 1994 in a neighboring country to facilitate genocidal 
killing, ipso facto these events spell a preparation for a possible genocide in Burundi. The text on 
latrine construction demonstrates the mirroring analytics well:
On 1 May 2016, President Nkurunziza announced that community work, which takes place 
every Saturday, would henceforth focus on installing latrines  […] alongside all roads, in all 
local communities (collines), at marketplaces and in all other public spaces. Our organizations 
are concerned that these latrines may be used as mass graves, as has been the case during 
the current crisis and in 1994 at the time of the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda. Some months 
before the genocide there, the Rwandan authorities had ordered the construction of latrines 
throughout the country and these were transformed into pits for bodies between April and 
July 1994.35
Importantly, labeling here (calling the crisis “repression with genocidal dynamics”36) has the 
potential to create anxiety and a resurgence of traumatic memory. Fear thrives on analogies. It is 
Burundians themselves who start seeing familiar patterns in the happenings around them. The 
worried observations of surging numbers of phones in hands of local authorities and machete 
distributions after all come from “sources on the ground.”37 Others such as refugees might use 
genocide as a ready-made frame they know has impact. A young arrival at the refugee Mahama 
camp, claiming he was assaulted by the Imbonerakure militias, explained that “we fled because 
they said they were going to do a genocide of Tutsis that don’t accept the views of Nkurunziza.”38 
The genocide frame must be seen as mutually constituted and its impacts as reaching beyond 
problematic analysis. 
On the level of domestic politics, the opposition has used the term to garner action against 
the government, while the government has used different outlets to counter these claims. “Indeed, 
members of the political opposition in Burundi began invoking the risk of genocide as early as 
February 2014.”39 More recently in April 2017, the Spokesman of the opposition umbrella CNARED 
has suggested with reference to the Imbonerakure chants inciting members to sexual violence that 
“what is going on is a copy-paste of what happened in Rwanda before the Genocide of 1994.”40
Meanwhile, “Government officials in Burundi bristle at the comparison [with Rwandan 
genocide]. Presidential spokesman Willy Nyamitwe said ‘There will be no war or genocide,’ while 
maintaining the government was trying to suppress ‘acts of terrorism (…).’”41 Interestingly, the 
33 See, Bridgland, Burundi’s ‘Great Fear.’
34 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) & Ligue ITEKA, Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Burundi, 41.
35 Ibid. An important caveat is due here: The report’s claim that latrines were being built en masse prior to the Rwandan 
genocide has not been corroborated in the literature. It does not feature in one of the most detailed accounts, and 
namely Alison Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story:’ Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch and International 
Federation of Human Rights, 3169, no. 189 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
36 Ibid., 11.
37 Ibid., 40. The sources here (in reference to phone distribution) are not actually detailed. The sources on machete 
distribution are mostly national and international human rights organisations. 
38 Philip Kleinfeld, “Burundi: Time is Running Out,” New Internationalist, January 24, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, 
https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2017/01/24/burundi-time-is-running-out/.
39 Cronin-Furman and Broache, the G-word in Burundi.
40 “Video of CNDD-FDD Youth Causes a Scandal in Burundi,” The Citizen, April 10, 2017, accessed April 12, 2017, http://
citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1483356/video-of-cndd-fdd-youth-causes-a-scandal-in-burundi/. 
41 Gaffey, Burundi Must Learn.
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government has resorted to the label when it proved profitable. The government accused its neighbor 
Rwanda of arming refugees in camps, thus fomenting genocide in Burundi. Pascal Nyabenda, the 
President of the ruling CNDD-FDD party has accused Paul Kagame of “recruiting and training 
young Burundians in refugee camps in Rwanda, so that they can return home to commit acts of 
genocide.”42 This was a clear provocation to a government that styles itself as a liberator and one 
that ends genocide rather than exports it, pointing at the strained bilateral relations between these 
two countries. Indeed, Kagame did not abstain from further bolstering this symbolic capital by 
announcing that Burundi “should have learned from our history.” He called on Burundi “not to 
repeat the ethnic violence that ended in genocide in his country in 1994.”43
Overall then, we cannot see the prominence of the label simply through the lens of the press, 
but rather the constellation of actors that have together embraced its renewed value in order to 
influence action by external actors and the course of the conflict on the ground. But as shown, the 
label’s power seeps beyond politics of intervention and legitimization, being appropriated as a 
ready-made and useful frame, and with the all-too-real potential to affect the sense of security and 
contribute to anxiety by resuscitating memories of a violent past. 
But some caveats are due to the story of the label’s prominence as drawn up thus far. First, it 
is questionable whether ordinary Burundians resort to the label of genocide at all. In my research 
between 2013 and 2015, this term seemed to pertain mostly to international and national civil society 
and organizations, with ordinary people choosing ambiguous and general ways of describing past 
events of violence in the country, including the “selective genocide” of 1972. With the crisis and 
intense deployment of the term its salience has surely increased and people interfacing with the 
humanitarian architecture might choose it as a way to render their situation intelligible to them. 
Second, we must acknowledge a level of heterodoxy and the dissenting voices. A number of blogs, 
reports and most academics have been disputing the ethnic portrayal of the crisis and the rush to 
label the crisis as genocide.44 Despite these important caveats, it remains the case that genocide as 
a label has gained traction and has been intensely deployed in reference to Burundi, in ways that 
alternative framings of the crisis have not. The effects of this are explored in the next section.
Last but not least, the way in which the dominant portrayal works with time and across time 
is interesting.  The temporal dimension here refers both to how the genocide discourse builds 
expectation and utilizes anticipations of escalation, and to its own endurance across time. In 
terms of anticipation, the portrayal works with the notion of imminence. FIDH’s #StopThisMovie 
campaign is a good example. The organization has been promoting a fake movie trailer “Genocide 
in Burundi, by Pierre Nkurunziza” with the tagline “the only movie you don’t want to see.” The 
short clip shows screaming Burundian children running for their lives through windings red 
paths crisscrossing verdant valley floors. The camera chases after them, closing up on them like a 
predator, while rhythmic, ominous music plays in the background. Fake media clips flash across 
the screen: “Huge Bloodshed,” “Climate of Fear,” “Deadly Violence,” “Mass Atrocities.” The last 
screen entirely bathed in red announces: “As you are reading this, the risk of genocide in Burundi 
is imminent. Act together and prevent this fiction from becoming reality #StopThisMovie.” 
The language of imminence is a systematic feature of the discourse hoping to garner preventive 
action. In April 2015, NYT speaks of Burundi “on the brink,” “edg[ing] towards a precipice.”45 
In November 2015, Adama Dieng speaks of a “tipping point”46 and so does France’s deputy 
ambassador to the UN, Alexis Lamek:47 “The escalating violence in Burundi has reached a very 
42 “Burundi Accuses Rwanda of Trying to Export Genocide,” The Telegraph, March 27, 2016, accessed, March 12, 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/27/burundi-accuses-rwanda-of-trying-to-export-genocide/. 
43 “Rwandan President Urges Burundi not to Repeat Genocide,” The Guardian, November 8, 2015, accessed March 30, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/rwandan-president-urges-burundi-not-to-repeat-genocide.
44 See for example, Cronin-Furman and Broache, the G-word in Burundi.
45 Jean Claude Nkundwa and Jonathan W. Rosen, “Burundi on the Brink,” The New York Times, April 28, 2015, accessed 
April, 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/opinion/burundi-on-the-brink.html?_r=0.
46 Un News, Burundi experienced ‘Deep political crisis.’
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worrying stage, maybe a tipping point,” he suggested, “If we let the tensions escalate without 
doing anything, the whole country could explode.” In January 2016, Minority Rights International 
warns of “a tipping point.”48 Most recently, in an article from January 2017 entitled “Burundi: Time 
is Running Out,” the author describes an “escalating crisis.”49 The situation in Burundi is indeed 
dire, both in terms of repression, human rights violations and unmet basic needs. But the repeated 
referral to tipping points clashes with what is instead a gradual yet pervasive entrenchment of a 
new and worrying status quo. The repeated evocations of imminent and irreversible escalation are 
nonetheless interesting, and the next section will ask what sort of effects are borne when repeated 
alarm isn’t met with the desired response.
Bearing Effects: How Genocide Alarm Interacts with the Ongoing Conflict
In the present section, I want to make three key arguments about the unintended effects of 
sounding the genocide alarm on Burundi for over two years in the context of failing international 
action. First, the ‘ethnic genocide’ frame obscures the political drivers of the crisis and the anatomy 
of likely escalation – that of civil war— which is no less serious. But the intensity of focus makes 
this more than a story of misrepresentation as the framing takes away energy from an alternative 
approach (i.e., missed representation). Second, genocide prevention driven interventionism has 
in fact emboldened and radicalized regime isolationism, and by extension, narrowed the leeway 
of the regional and international community in fostering government cooperation and dialogue. 
Genocide is a radical accusation leveled at the government and due to its known impact, has been 
eagerly taken up as resource by actors ranging from the opposition to international media and civil 
society. But radical accusations have tended to radicalize the government’s own stance. Third and 
last, protracted crying wolf has devalued the G word as currency in Burundi, raising questions 
about its usefulness as a preventive frame over time. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that i) genocide framing cannot be disconnected from 
the conflict dynamics on the ground; and that ii) rather than preventing escalation, the genocide 
framing has potentially further entrenched the political standoff in Burundi. It has not averted 
the entrenchment of repression in the country and has failed to open up key channels of political 
solution to the crisis, raising the risk of return to civil war.
The ethnic genocide frame obfuscates the nature of the conflict in Burundi today and how 
conflict dynamics have changed over time. More broadly, it maintains African conflict in the 
representational straightjacket of ethnic conflict, a familiar but flawed paradigm. This paradigm 
has a tendency to i) conflate cause and description (people might be targeted based on ethnicity, 
which is different from ethnic fear or hate causing the violence), ii) to conflate cause and effect 
(cleavages and polarization often result from conflict rather than being caused by it), and iii) to 
obscures change over time (underlying causes and even descriptives change). 
The misrepresentation in the case of Burundi results from the failure to draw these important 
distinctions and from the ease of reading the past into the present. Burundi has indeed seen genocides 
of both Hutu and Tutsi in the past (1972 and 1993, respectively). Its neighbor Rwanda is indeed 
deceptively similar in its ethnic make-up and has seen a genocide as well— that of the Tutsi in 1994. 
But even Rene Lemarchand’s seminal book entitled “Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide” does 
not argue ethnicity is a cause of protracted violence across Burundi’s post-independence history. 
While the conflict certainly fell across ethnic lines (with other important lines of cleavage, including 
intra-ethnic/regional also playing their part), at heart it tied to systematic political exclusion of the 
Hutu from power and the ruling ethnocracy’s escalating repressive measures against any political 
and military challenge mounted by the majority. 
47 Colin Freeman, “We are Powerless to Stop Rwandan-style Genocide in Burundi,’ admits UN,” The Telegraph, 
November 10, 2015, accessed, March 21, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
burundi/11987055/We-are-powerless-to-stop-Rwandan-style-genocide-in-Burundi-admits-UN.html.
48 “Burundi at tipping point, government and international community must do more to prevent escalation of conflict, 
warns MRG,” (Press Release, January 22, 2016), Minority Rights International, accessed March 12, 2017, http://
minorityrights.org/2016/01/22/burundi-at-tipping-point-government-and-international-community-must-do-more-to-
prevent-escalation-of-conflict-warns-mrg/.
49 Kleinfeld, Burundi: Time is Running Out.
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But today, we cannot read the crisis in these same terms, the Hutu are no longer excluded from 
power. The protest movement and opposition that emerged in reaction to the President’s decision 
to hold on to power and the regime’s increasing authoritarianism are decidedly cross ethnic, as 
are the refugees, and the casualties. This is not to deny that ethnic animosities linger on or that 
some people on the ground do in fact read the past through an ethnic lens. Violence has a tendency 
to harden inter-group boundaries and that violent past has not been ever dealt with through a 
functional transitional justice mechanism. But this simply cannot explain the onset of the current 
crisis, its more structural drivers, the nature of the escalation, or even the descriptives – who is 
targeted, who is intimidated, who flees. Both the causatives and the descriptives are distinctly 
political today. The conflict in Burundi has transformed.
In fact, we need to highlight two rather counter-intuitive dynamics. First, we can argue that 
what stubbornly remains a form of “success” amidst crisis is Burundi’s power-sharing architecture 
set up under the 2000 Arusha peace accord, a complex consociational arrangement carefully 
distributing power among the two dominant ethnic groups. As Reyntjens has argued, this has 
effectively resulted in “ethnic pacification” in Burundi.50 Second, the increased attention to and 
alarmism regarding “ethnic genocide” might, in a self-fulfilling prophecy fashion, perversely 
contribute to the very dynamics the discourse is trying to avert. In a tense political environment, 
hyperbole has the potential to fan fear and suspicion, and to contribute to ethnic polarization.
But if the ethnic frame is ill fitting, and if what is at stake is political partisanship – with 
perceived opposition being the target of violence and repression— could we still argue that genocide 
could result? Strictly speaking, the UN definition does not allow for political opinion (stated or 
imputed) as a basis of genocide, a limitation critiqued by the likes of Leo Kuper and Helen Fein 
who propose alternative concepts such as politicide. Interestingly, this option – targeting based on 
political opinion aiming for categorical extermination— is extremely difficult for many observers 
of the current crisis to fathom. Even as they highlight the political nature of the conflict, the risk of 
genocide is read almost invariably on an ethnic basis. 
But is Burundi at risk of politicide being committed? Arguably, neither ethnicity nor collective 
targeting for annihilation is correct as an analytical lens. The government has indeed targeted its 
opponents en masse and systematically. By and large, the method has not been physical violence 
but effective intimidation. The casualty counts remain relatively low, even as human rights abuses 
in detention have ballooned. The Imbonerakure militias together with the memories of a violent past 
have performed most of the labor, producing widespread anxiety, fear and lending believability 
to the threats. The result is mass outflows of people, and though not all leave because (or solely 
because) of political intimidation, a large portion of the opposition, including civil society and 
human rights watchdogs have fled abroad. Almost 400,000 Burundians have fled their country, 
which matches the peaks of displacement during its civil war and after the 1972 genocide. But we 
also know that opposition abroad means opportunities for mobilization and potentially armed 
struggle if political platforms for resolution do not work. Based on the available evidence then, 
the threat of escalation in Burundi is not to genocide, but an insurgency (or insurgencies) and/or a 
full-scale civil war.
Certainly, it can be argued that different forms of violence can and do co-occur. But it is 
important to look at the relationship between them. As Scott Straus has shown, civil war involving 
a collectively framed opponent –typically ethnically framed but could be otherwise- is what really 
heightens the risk of genocide.51 This has been the case in Rwanda in 1994, and in Burundi in 1972 
and 1993. This causality chain suggests that, properly speaking, what needs attention and needs to 
be prevented is escalation to civil war, which under some circumstances can lead to genocide. This 
means that what needs to be promoted is a political solution and dialogue, rather than military 
interventionism and policing of the regime, the effects of which can range from ineffective to 
counter-productive.
50 See, Filip Reyntjens, “Burundi: Institutionalizing Ethnicity to Bridge the Ethnic Divide,” in Constitutions and Conflict 
Management in Africa, ed. Alan Kuperman (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 49.
51  Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2015).
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Looking at the inside of the country, our analysis does not render too dissimilar a set of 
conclusions. Between years 2015-2017 (the latter year marking the finalization of this draft), we 
have seen a significant democratic rollback: systematic repression and human rights abuse, the 
dismantling of freedoms and liberties, attack on the free press and civil society. The economic 
and humanitarian situation is dire. As the country implodes, the government chooses to repress 
grievances rather than to open up inclusive dialogue and search for a political solution. This 
directly contributes to escalation of the conflict as sections of the opposing forces might consider 
military solutions as the only viable ones. We have seen precisely these dynamics unfold in 
real time, first with an unsuccessful military coup, increasingly violent protests, and formation 
of militant groups abroad.52 The discourse of tipping points and a precipice also largely missed 
what were more gradual but steady and hard-to-reverse escalations. Overall then, what is at stake 
with genocide labeling is not simply misrepresentation, but missed representation— the focus on 
genocide prevents another, more appropriate frame from being applied and driving action. 
The logic of violence in the crisis has itself evolved, with genocide labeling playing its own 
part. After an acute phase of protest and repression in the streets, the government has managed to 
crush domestic public enough to assure a level of submission. The government calls this “peace” 
and “stability” when what we witness is a cementing of a new status quo based on effective 
intimidation and repression that has now moved offstage to detention, policing, intimidation 
and selective assassination. Though evidence for genocidal violence was not present at any point 
during the crisis, the intense alarm sounding and salience of genocide has certainly assured that 
the government would not try any of the sort. Again, labeling produces endogeneity effects – it is 
not an “independent” variable in the crisis. This effect and government’s carefulness should not be 
read as a form of “paradoxical success,” however. The type of violence that might actually come 
about and that the genocidal framing overlooks might be as deadly, if not more widespread.
Why has a misfitting frame been so vigorously embraced? One reason is certainly the weight 
carried by the G word and hoped-for ability to garner action. But this is not the full story; the 
nature of analysis is key as well. The anatomy of the Burundi crisis portrayal reveals the distinct 
logics of analysis-through-analogy, mirroring, and correlation. One could attribute this solely to 
the ease with which an untrained eye sees parallels in a region whose past has seen a number of 
genocides unfold. But there is also the broader issue of enduring and reductive metanarratives on 
Africa’s conflict and identity, their nexus, and their unchanging character. Finally, and importantly, 
prevention diagnostics can themselves mislead. Early warning is based on identifying a set of 
indicators that typically precede genocide, working essentially on a correlative basis rather than an 
in-depth study of causalities. 
Verdejo reviewed multiple frameworks and compiled a rather exhaustive list of the indicators 
that feature on them.53 The list approach does not give guides as to causal combinatorics, it does 
not identify what aspects are essential, in what combinations and under what conditions. It might 
also inflate threat because a number of indicators might have divergent possible outcomes or 
causes (i.e., repression or transfer of weapons to security forces). But most importantly, a lot of the 
indicators, when assessed closely, simply do not apply to Burundi. They all revolve around the 
notion of targeting of a specific group, and the stepping up of that targeting such as rallies against 
the group; stripping of rights and citizenship, hate rhetoric, or physical segregation. The genocide 
frame implies that such targeting of Tutsi in Burundi exists, but the targeting that does exist is of 
opposition, of which Tutsi are a part, rather than of the group per se. It does not revolve around 
denaturalization and dehumanization in its varied forms, rather around repression and its tactics. 
If we were to follow the mirroring/parallels frame, we would also see key ingredients missing that 
were present in the three regional genocides—a context of an armed insurgency or violent coup 
(both in Rwanda 1994 and Burundi 1972 and 1993) and the killing of political leaders (in Rwanda 
1994 and Burundi 1993). 
52 Two armed opposition forces have already emerged: Republican Forces of Burundi (FOREBU) and Resistance for the 
Rule of Law in Burundi (RED Tabara).
53 Ernesto Verdeja, “Predicting Genocide and Mass Atrocities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 (2016), 13-32.
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To conclude, if the genocide frame is limiting, could the recently popularized “mass atrocity” 
frame be more fitting? It is David Scheffer who has called for the introduction of the new term 
“atrocity crimes” and a new field of international law (“atrocity law”) to describe serious human 
rights abuses including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in “a single term that is 
easily understood by the public.”54 The attempt is then usefully to move beyond the narrow frame 
of genocide and call attention to a range of serious crimes without elevating one as the ultimate 
violation. Hence the new phrase “mass atrocity prevention.” The Burundi context certainly fits 
better with the rubric of crimes against humanity as we have witnessed torture in detention, 
disappearances and widespread persecution. But there are two important caveats. As a call to 
action, persecution and even torture remain weak grounds, as evidenced in case after case of 
such “peace crimes.” In fact, here it is much more effective to argue for the risk of civil war and 
insurgency, as these bear a high risk of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and in fact heighten 
the risk of genocide being committed.55 Connected to this, while mass atrocity better captures the 
nature of crimes perpetrated by the Burundian government, it does not get to the core of what 
drives conflict escalation in the country, and hence what can drive increased incidence of mass 
atrocity. It is largely a descriptive tool rather than a predictive one. 
If “missed representation” is perhaps the most important impact of the genocide framing, 
others cannot be neglected, including the argument that attempts at genocide-prevention-driven 
interventionism have radicalized the Burundi’s government’s stance towards international and 
regional cooperation. Though regional and international bodies allow intervention into third states 
against their will on R2P grounds (if genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes occur), in 
Burundi such intervention force has failed to materialize. 
In December 2015, at the heels of a mass government crackdown in response to attack on army 
bases and a surge in the genocide rhetoric and framing, the AU announced that it would create 
a 5,000-troop strong force (MAPROBU) to protect civilians in Burundi. Almost immediately, the 
government threatened that any unauthorized force would be engaged militarily. The AU force 
would be considered, the government stated, “an attack on the country and every Burundian will 
stand up and fight against them.”56 The very aim of the genocide framing then—decisive action— 
was thwarted. Not only did AU fail to send in a peacekeeping force, the UN failed to send in an 
unarmed police force of 228 in July 2016.
But the story is not simply one of failed intervention. It is also a story of how radical accusation 
(of the ultimate crime) and threats of intervention interacted with the government’s willingness to 
cooperate at all. The government has closed in on itself. There has been a visible effect over time. 
Two years of close scrutiny and high-level pronouncements on genocide signals, pointing of fingers 
to hate speech, accusations of ethnic profiling and incitements to ethnic violence have been matched 
by extreme measures from the side of the government in the form of ever-greater isolationism 
buttressed by time-proven arguments of sovereignty. The threats emboldened the regime to resort 
to sovereignty as an effective last resort to shore up impunity, and merely contributed to decreased 
visibility of violence and repression, which have now moved offstage. 
The rejection of international monitors, a civilian protection force and police observers 
has been extended to investigative missions as well. “Angered by the scrutiny, the Nkurunziza 
government on October 11, 2016, stopped cooperating with UN agencies, including the UN 
Human Rights Council and the International Commission of Inquiry on Burundi.”57 This quote is 
one demonstration of the fact that the counterargument “the government would have behaved the 
same regardless of international attention” does not hold. Surely, it has taken a radical stance of 
no-deals with the opposition (branded as subversives, even terrorists) early on in the crisis and has 
54 Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, abstract.
55 See, Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, 11, 17-88. 
56 “Burundi crisis: Pierre Nkurunziza Threatens to Fight AU Peacekeepers,” BBC, December 30, 2015, accessed March 15, 
2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35198897.
57 “Dismantling the Arusha Accords as the Burundi Crisis Rages On,” Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, March 13, 2017, 
accessed April 6, 2017, http://africacenter.org/spotlight/dismantling-the-arusha-accords-as-the-burundi-crisis-rages-
on/.
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hardly budged since. But dramatic foreign coverage spilling into local crossfire did play its part in 
a broader pattern of ‘closing off,’ even if this cannot be quantified. 
The government works the international accent on “genocide” into a broader international 
conspiracy to undermine the current government. In an informal discussion with a Burundian civil 
servant in the summer of 2017, the paranoia of the government was palpable and a major change 
from the past. Aside from new scrutiny and even intimidation of researchers (and application of the 
friend/enemy labels on them in line with the broader political sphere), it became clear through the 
discussion that the international society inclusive of diplomats, NGOs and academics is seen with 
suspicion for its potential role in subversion and “covert operations” with the aim to undermine 
the government. The government was demonstrating siege mentality.
The increased isolationism and rejection of outside scrutiny has had the opposite effect to 
what effective prevention requires, accurate and timely access to vital information. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the threats of intervention have also eroded regional and international community’s 
leverage in creating the grounds for a workable political dialogue. Genocide is a strong indictment, 
and accordingly, such sharp accusations have tended to radicalize the government’s own stance. 
The case of Burundi teaches us that genocide framing, when turned into a powerful accusation 
married to empty threats, is not simply ineffective but can be counterproductive to the de-escalation 
and resolution of the crisis.
Last but not least, we need to return to temporal dynamics once again and consider the 
proposition that protracted sounding of alarm devalues the G word as currency in prevention. If 
the genocide label is seen as a representational resource, then the case of Burundi opens important 
questions about its changing value over time, and the possible impacts of this. The case is unique 
as we can observe the genocide label being “spent” intensely for over two years, with the result of 
increased attention but failed intervention. In the case of Darfur, Miles has argued that “avoidance 
of the signifying label of ‘genocide’ in the media leads to a downgrading of attention to, and 
salience of Darfur among the public at large, their elected representatives, and policy makers.”58 
But could the reverse—protracted embrace instead of avoidance— equally downgrade attention 
and the broader traction of the label? Since the price of a “false negative” is so high, denying or 
withdrawing the label is risky and thus unlikely. But only a more systematic and longer-term 
study can provide satisfactory insights and validation. 
Conclusion 
The recent Burundi crisis has offered us a unique laboratory to observe and better understand the 
changing political economy of preventative labeling, and the effects that ensue when the genocide 
label is embraced actively in attempts to avert escalation of a conflict in a region “known” and 
“branded” by its past of genocide. But dominant frames and “lessons of the past” do not always 
bode well for prevention, even if these frames carry much weight in terms of alarm. The reading of 
genocide into the Burundi crisis, as shown in the paper, has mischaracterized both the causatives and 
the descriptives of the unfolding conflict, as well as the nature of actual and likely escalation. More 
broadly, the labeling demonstrates the continued traction of certain problematic characterizations 
of African conflict as ethnic at its core, and as unchanging over time. The Burundi case carefully 
challenges these enduring conceptions and suggests that prevention must be anchored in a closer 
reading of conflict and its transformation over time, embracing historicity, change and complexity 
and discarding easy analogies and parallels. 
Preventive analysis and action must also pay careful attention to its own imbrication in the 
dynamics on the ground from which it is far from isolated. Political actors, the opposition, civil 
society and sections of the population in Burundi have been attuned to the salience of genocide as 
a label and have used it to further their own positions and interests. But the alarmism caused by 
the framing has equally the potential to raise anxiety and evoke the traumas of a violent past. By 
speaking of and repeatedly highlighting “signals” of imminent genocide, it can also certainly serve 
to harden precisely those cleavages that it wants to prevent. Preventative action needs to take into 
account such unintended effects. 
58 Miles, Labeling Genocide in Sudan, 260.
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But as shown, the effects of labeling Burundi crisis as genocide are wider reaching yet. The 
portrayal wasn’t accurate and wasn’t productive of preventive action, but more than this— it has 
proven counter-productive. The mislabeling of the crisis as genocide has contributed to the political 
standoff. First, the genocide frame and campaigning has over time seen (not necessarily caused) 
decreased visibility of violence and repression in Burundi, which has now moved offstage and been 
more systematized. This is not an uncommon pattern as open violence is costly in multiple ways, 
including political, and economic. The relative “quiet” on the streets merely demonstrates that 
repressive control has been successfully exercised. Rather than diffusing grievances, a solidifying 
status quo might sharpen them. The mass atrocity campaign misses these dynamics wholly as it 
is continually on the search for “signs” of impending mass atrocity, and specifically genocide. 
Connected to this then, the genocide labeling has diverted initiative from a civil war focus as a 
more pressing threat in terms of escalation.
Second, accusations of genocide have contributed to a broader trend whereby the government 
feels besieged by foreign and domestic parties intent to subvert it and responds with closing off 
and turning away from cooperation and disposition to engage international pressure. The verve 
with which the international community in particular applies what the government sees as an 
exaggerated and misfitting label merely confirms its suspicion of a “grand subversion.” In this 
manner, the labeling plays its part in the increased retreat of the government from meaningful 
dialogue and its intent to entrench the status quo. Reversal in this attitude might come soon; but 
rather than being a function of genocide campaigning, it is primarily a function of the dire economic 
situation and the regime’s vulnerability vis-à-vis foreign aid and funds.
Last but not least, protracted alarm sounding devalues not only the G-word as currency but, 
arguably, strategic labeling as a preventative device in general. Over time, “demonstration effects” 
bear their fruit as actors on the ground learn that even intense campaigning is followed by inaction, 
repeatedly. The effects of long-term labeling are thus an interesting new chapter in the study of the 
political economy of preventative frames and genocide more specifically, and a promising area of 
future research. More generally, further research is certainly needed to understand preventive (as 
opposed to post-facto) genocide labeling. Nonetheless what is clear already is that all actors in the 
enterprise need to think more carefully about their strategies and the full gamut of their impacts. 
The sense of uncertainty in an unfolding crisis is real, but a quick deployment of powerful frames 
might not prove useful in bringing the crisis to a quicker and less violent close, as Burundi shows.
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